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The policymaking process of the European Union (EU) is 
particularly convoluted and reflects an institutional structure 
that is unique among governance entities. The institutional 
structure of the Union is complex, with a multitude of co-
decision making and advisory bodies. The ways in which these 
institutions interact in the Union’s policymaking process (i.e., 
the EU’s organizational structure) is governed by a complex set 
of treaties. We argue that institutional and organizational 
structures have normative content because they embody specific 
ideologies of integration. A historical analysis of the evolution of 
European integration reveals that the peculiarities of the 
European Union's institutional and organizational structure are 
a result of the influence of three distinct ideologies about the 
desired nature of international organization: functionalism, 
intergovernmentalism, and federalism. The Union's roots as the 
European Coal and Steel Community and the ideas of Jean 
Monnet concerning the shape and path of European integration, 
moderated by federalist and intergovernmentalist ideas, were 
fundamental in determining the European Union’s institutional 
structure and shaping its policymaking process. 
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Understanding the role of institutions in the process of public 
policymaking suffers from a curious dichotomy. On the one hand, the 
related fields of political science, public policy studies, and public 
administration acknowledge the role of governmental (as well as 
non-governmental) organizations at every stage of the policymaking 
process, from problem identification and agenda formation, to policy 
implementation and evaluation. Thus, most studies focusing on a specific 
functional policy area consider the role of organizations in policymaking, 
and understand that institutional and organizational structures affect the 
ways in which policies are developed, adopted, and implemented in 
crucially important ways. The literature on this subject spans many years 
and is very large, only a small sample can be cited here, including Gains 
(2003), Feiock and Kim (2001), Mény and Wagenaar (2000), Mény et al. 
(1996), Denhardt (1989), Brunner and Meltzer (1979). Furthermore, we must 
point out that, in the context of a policymaking system, it is important to 
differentiate between organizational and institutional structures and 
analyze the characteristics of both (Hadjilambrinos, 1998, pp. 186-192). 
On the other hand, the history of the development of institutions is 
virtually ignored as an explanatory element in the study of institutions’ role 
in policymaking. Thus, the potential is created for serious problems and 
misconceptions in our understanding of the policymaking process. Paul 
Pierson’s study Politics in Time: History, Institutions, and Social Analysis (2004) 
presents a particularly insightful discussion of this problems. This, of course, 
is not to say that the history of institutions is not a frequent subject of study; 
historical accounts of institutional and organizational development abound. 
The problem is that such historical accounts generally do not attempt to 
connect the historical and policymaking dimensions. 
This study traces the history of the evolution of the European Union, 
from the conditions that led to the proposal for a European Coal and Steel 
Community (World War II and its aftermath) to the Treaty on European 
Union (Maastricht Treaty), which essentially set the current institutional 
and organizational structures of the Union. An important objective of the 
study is to identify the ideological underpinnings of the various streams of 
thought about the form a political union of European nation-states should 
have. This approach presumes that normative factors (the ideas or beliefs of 
particular actors) are primarily responsible for the particular direction the 
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process of European integration has followed and that these normative 
factors are discernible in the institutional and organizational structure of 
the European Union. Traditional analyses of the European integration 
process have generally divided into two broad categories.  
There is general agreement amongst both the historians and theorists of 
European integration that the particular conditions prevailing in post-
World War II Europe and, in particular, the unique problems faced by 
France created the circumstances that led to the establishment of the first 
supranational institutions. However, careful analysis of the prevailing 
political conditions reveals that the challenges of the period could have 
been met in ways other than the surrender of sovereignty to supranational 
institutions and that, furthermore, there was no political consensus 
supporting the supranational solution (and, in fact, there was considerable 
opposition to the idea). Studies reaching these abound, and include Parsons 
(2002), Hitchcock (1998), Bossuat (1995), Deighton (1995), Brunet (1993), di 
Nolfo (1992), Gillingham (1991), and Criddle (1969). The analysis of French 
politics vis a vis the construction of European institutions in particular, 
shows that the beliefs of certain key individuals about the shape the 
international organization of Western Europe ought to take led to the 
creation of the ECSC and determined the ultimate structure of the 
European Union: 
“Pro-community” leaders who obtained power on other, disconnected 
issues used their agenda-setting authority to assemble majorities behind 
their personal ideas and to strike particular international bargains.” 
(Parsons, 2002, pp. 55-56) 
If normative factors such as critical actors’ beliefs can be shown to be a 
determinant of the institutional structure of the EU, then they can also be 
shown to affect (though not necessarily determine) the EU’s policymaking 
process. Political institutions, as organized entities, discriminate among 
conflicts: they move certain issues to the forefront of political debate while 
ignoring others, they show preference for certain types of policy solutions, 
they establish limits on the type and scope of political action, etc. (Egeberg, 
2003; Hix, 1998; March and Olsen, 1989). Thus, the ideological foundations 
of political institutions affect, at least in part, the conduct of politics in the 
institutions. Therefore, identifying the ideological underpinnings of 
institutions and relating them to institutional and organizational structures 
is an essential step in gaining a thorough understanding of policymaking 
processes. 
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2. The prehistory of European Union 
 
The idea of a political unification of Europe is not something that arose 
from the devastation of World War II. It can be traced much farther than 
that, to at least the fourteenth century, developing in parallel with the 
institution of the nation state. In fact, the earliest proposals for a union of 
sovereign entities, those of the French jurist and diplomat Pierre Dubois in 
1306, and of George of Podebrad, king of Bohemia in 1463, were meant to 
counter the efforts of the Roman Catholic Church, through the Holy Roman 
Empire, to achieve an imperial unification of Europe (Hadjilambrinos, 
2018). 
Proposals for creating a European common polity of some sort 
continued over the next three centuries. Some of the most notable of these 
came from the Duke of Sully (1560-1641), Eméric Crucé (1590-1648), 
William Penn (1644-1718), Abbé de Saint-Pierre (1658-1743), Jean Jacques 
Rousseau (1712-1778), and Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832) (Hadjilambrinos, 
2018; Foerster, 1967; de Rougemont, 1966; Halecki, 1963). While most of 
these proposals were based on an intergovernmental model of integration 
(i.e., one based on representatives of sovereigns or governments), some, 
notably those by Penn and Bentham, were truly federalist in proposing 
structures based on direct representation of the peoples of Europe. It is 
notable that the normative underpinnings of each proposal was reflected in 
the institutional structure it put forth: intergovernmental proposals 
generally centered on councils of representatives of the governments of the 
various nation-states, the federalist proposals centered on parliamentary 
assemblies that were elected by, and, therefore, directly represented the 
people (Hadjilambrinos, 2018). 
The nineteenth and early twentieth centuries brought along an 
important change in the character of proposals for European unification. 
Early in this period, Henri de Saint-Simon published a plan for European 
Federation, which set out an incremental process of integration. Saint-
Simon’s plan called for the union of only Britain and France, with other 
countries joining as they adopted parliamentary systems of government 
and as their people developed a common European identity. Recognizing 
that the institutions of the Federation would be the most important vehicle 
for the evolution of such an identity, Saint Simon had to address the 
problem of how the Federation and its institutions would be made possible 
without a broadly established European identity. He got around this 
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problem by proposing a functional approach to integration, based on free 
trade, and by having the Federation’s parliamentary body represent not the 
people of the member states, but those segments of the population that 
were more likely to have a common European identity: the business, 
industrial, scientific, and administrative elites (Saint Simon, 1814). 
Saint Simon’s proposal ushered an era during which functionalist ideals, 
based on the industrial revolution’s emergent values of efficiency, 
productivity, and economic growth, came to dominate the proposals for 
European integration. During the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
century, a number of prominent Europeans, including Anatole and Paul 
Leroy-Beaulieu, Sir Max Waecther, the Prince de Cassano, Louis Loucheur, 
and Aristide Briand, put forth plans for European unification based on 
economic integration. These plans generally proposed institutional 
structures that were dominated by technocrats, similar to what had been 
proposed by Saint Simon (Hadjilambrinos, 2018; Pegg 1983). Though the 
plans by Loucheur and Briand actually came close to fruition, the shock of 
the Great Depression and the emergence of radical nationalist movements 
in the 1930s prevented that from happening. 
The Second World War created a new dynamic for European 
integration. The occupation of most of Western Europe by the Nazi war 
machine led to the creation of numerous “governments in exile,” all of 
which were based on British territory. In order to be able to continue the 
war effort, these governments had to cooperate closely with each other and 
with the British and, later, U.S. governments in all political, military, and 
economic (primarily procurement of military equipment and supplies) 
matters. This experience, which built upon the similar experience of 
cooperation in the planning of production of war materiel during the First 
World War, established an important base for future efforts at integration. 
The devastation of the war and the loss of both military and economic 
preeminence of the Western European nations drove home, to both the 
peoples and political elites of the part of the continent that remained 
outside Soviet domination, the point that a certain degree of integration 
was essential to the political and economic survival of Europe. Yet, for 
several years after the end of the war, and despite the construction of 
institutions such as The Council of Europe and the Organization for 
European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), no true federal structures had 
emerged, and no transfer of sovereignty had taken place. Both The Council 
of Europe and the OEEC remained intergovernmental bodies with no 
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policymaking authority, even though the former’s structure included a 
Parliamentary Assembly. Proposals for truly supranational institutions 
such as the European Defense Community (EDC) and the European 
Political Community failed (though the EDC treaty was signed in 1952, it 
did not come into force when the French Parliament voted against its 
ratification). 
 
3. Laying the foundations of the European Union: Jean Monnet and 
the European Coal and Steel Community 
 
The first intergovernmental institution in post-World War II Europe was 
the European Coal Organization (ECO). ECO was formed at the instigation 
of the U.S.A. almost immediately after the end of the war because of the 
severe disruption of energy supplies the war had caused. Heavily 
urbanized, Western Europe was primarily dependent on coal for the basic 
energy needs of its inhabitants. Before the war, over 90% of primary energy 
demand in the region was met by coal (Evans, 1979). The disruption of both 
supply and demand of coal which was caused by the war, made 
reconstruction contingent on steady supplies of coal, and rendered the 
rebuilding of coal industry an urgent objective (Lucas, 1977: 1-2). Given 
this, it is not at all surprising that the first truly supranational institutions in 
Europe, those of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) were 
constructed around an energy resource in general and coal in particular. 
The ECSC was the idea of Jean Monnet whose unique experience placed 
him in the position to take advantage of a critical conjunction of 
opportunities in order to overcome the problems that had stopped any 
progress of European integration beyond the stage of intergovernmental 
organizations. During the First World War, Monnet had served as France’s 
representative on the Inter-Allied Maritime Transport Council—a group of 
technical experts which controlled the allocation of shipping capacity by, 
itself, prioritizing the requests of the governments of the allied nations. 
This experience convinced him of the advantages of an international 
authority comprised of technocrats and operating outside the conventional 
political process. The cooperative way in which the national representatives 
would work to address common problems and then influence their 
governments at the initial stages of decision-making so they would act not 
to promote their strict self interest but, rather, the common good, was an 
invaluable lesson in supra nationality (Monnet, 1976: 92; Fransen 2001: 23-
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27). After the war, he served on the secretariat of The League of Nations, 
first as undersecretary-general and then as deputy secretary-general—the 
second highest ranking position in the organization. 
At the outbreak of the Second World War, Monnet pushed for the 
creation of a joint French and British authority to coordinate planning of 
the two nations’ war economies. When the two allied governments created 
the Franco-British Coordinating Committee, Monnet was appointed as 
chair, jointly by the two governments (at his insistence), and, on the basis of 
this dual appointment, declared himself an Allied official, rather than a 
national representative. In June 1940, when the collapse of France under the 
rapid advance of the German army became inevitable, Monnet crafted a 
proposal for the formation of an “indissoluble union” between France and 
Great Britain (a plan, similar in many ways to Saint-Simon’s proposal of 
just over a century before). After gaining the tacit approval of France’s 
Prime Minister Paul Reynaud, Monnet worked with Robert Vansittart, 
Chief Diplomatic Adviser to the British Foreign Secretary to write a 
preliminary draft of the Declaration of Union which was approved by the 
British War Council on the afternoon of June 16. Unfortunately, this came 
two days after the Germans had entered Paris and was too late to save the 
alliance. The French Cabinet had already turned against Reynaud who was 
forced to resign as prime minister that same day, being replaced by the 
Fascist-leaning Marshall Philippe Pétain. Six days later, the French 
government signed a peace treaty with Germany. 
After the war, Monnet oversaw the reconstruction of France as 
Commissioner (head) of the Commissariat Général du Plan (CGP)—an 
agency that he proposed and created in 1946, under the authority of the 
government of national unity of de Gaulle. While not a ministry, the 
Commissariat was placed, at Monnet’s insistence, directly under the Prime 
Minister. Furthermore, while it appeared to embody centralized planning, 
it actually took a broad consultative approach, relying on numerous (24 by 
1947) sectoral Modernization Commissions. Broad constituencies from each 
sector of the economy (consisting of employers, cadres, workers, and 
experts—a makeup reminiscent of Saint-Simon’s ideas) made up each 
sectoral Commission. The members were chosen by Monnet himself and 
served as individuals rather than as representatives of their own 
constituencies. The two-way communication, from the Commissions to the 
Commissariat to convey information that was used in planning, and from 
the Commissariat to the Commissions and, thus, to the constituencies, 
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communicating broad as well as sectoral objectives and goals, created 
broad support at the base, including within the bureaucracy, that was 
useful in convincing the politicians (the ministers and Parliament) to hold 
as close to the plan as possible when short-term political considerations 
would have caused significant departures (Duchêne, 1994: 147-180). The 
CGP’s success lies in “[t]he genius of [Monnet] and his lieutenants... to 
avoid ideology at the political and theoretical levels and demarcation 
disputes at the bureaucratic one; then to produce good papers and have 
good conversations to present their views and convince people...” 
(Duchêne, 1994: 178) By staying outside government and conventional 
ideological politics, Monnet remained as Planning Commissioner the only 
element of stable governance in the tumultuous Fourth Republic, outlasting 
in his time of service (from January 1947 till August 1952) twelve different 
governments. 
Because of the influence he exerted on every post-World War II French 
government up to 1952, Monnet was in a unique position during a unique 
conjunction of historical circumstances to advance the cause of European 
union decisively. The aftermath of World War I, and the near-success of 
Launcher’s and Briand’s plans for European integration had highlighted 
the singular position of France in advancing this cause. World War II made 
the interest of France in the European cause even clearer. As early as 1943, 
Monnet had developed some remarkably clear and prescient ideas about 
the role of France in unifying the continent, and about how such a union 
could be pursued: 
In Monnet’s view, the key to Europe was the reestablishment of 
democratic institutions within France. France, alone among the Allies, was 
unavoidably “European” and its fate was tied to that of Europe. Monnet 
threw together the English with the Russians and Americans who could 
pull out of Europe at will and retreat to their respective empires. This was 
not possible for France. In addition, with Italy and Germany crushed by the 
Allies, France would “again become the first continental power.” Monnet 
concluded that “it is therefore only from France that can come the 
conception of a New European Order and the impulse that can allow one, if 
not to hope for its complete realization, at least to try and achieve partial 
success.” (Fransen, 2001: 88) 
At that early time, Monnet foresaw the creation of a political entity 
around the heavy metallurgical industry, that was to definitely include 
France, Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and, possibly, Germany, 
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but definitely exclude Britain (due to its likely opposition to any truly 
supranational entity). (Fransen, 2001: 87-92) These ideas have clear links to 
those of the French Europeanists of the inter-war period, especially 
Loucheur (with whom Monnet had actually had a rather thorny 
relationship) and his ideas for the creation of supranational industrial 
cartels, and lead directly as far back as Saint-Simon. 
The unique conjunction of circumstances that enabled the realization of 
Monnet’s vision came about in 1949 and 1950. The end of the war had left 
Germany divided into Soviet, British, American, and French zones of 
control. In 1949 the Soviets established the Democratic Republic of 
Germany in the territories under their control and the other Allies, pushed 
by the U.S., countered by allowing the establishment of the Federal 
Republic of Germany in their zones. This raised the issue of assumption of 
German sovereign control over all of the areas controlled by the Western 
Allies, including the heavily industrialized areas of the Saar—which was 
under French control—and the Ruhr—which was under the jurisdiction of 
the International Ruhr Authority. France saw the full assumption of 
German sovereignty over these areas as particularly threatening because it 
would lose all means of control over energy and industrial resources that 
had become vital to its own post-war recovery. The signing of the North 
Atlantic Treaty in April 1949 led to increased pressure by the British and 
Americans on the French to accede to the establishment of full German 
sovereignty and to the re-militarization of Germany (something that was an 
even greater cause for worry to the French than relinquishing all control 
over German resources). The situation was brought to a head at the 
September 1949 meeting of the three Western Allies’ foreign ministers. At 
that time, the U.S. Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, gave the French a last 
chance to propose a constructive solution to the problem of German 
sovereignty. He requested that French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman 
present a proposal for a new German policy at the next meeting of the 
three, which was to take place in London in May 1950. 
Monnet seized this opportunity and tasked a small number of his staff at 
the CGP with helping him develop a proposal to present to Schuman. This 
proposal centered on placing the most important industries of the Saar and 
Ruhr, coal and steel, in the control of a supranational authority. This 
authority would assume control of not only the coal and steel industries of 
Germany but also of France and any other state that chose to join. Coal and 
steel were ideal as the functional areas on which the first supranational 
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European institutions were to be based. These were industries in which 
France and Germany were interdependent. Furthermore, coal and steel had 
great symbolic value as key strategic resources. These elements were 
recognized by Monnet, and on these he based his proposal for the creation 
of the ECSC. His thoughts on this matter are recounted in his memoirs: 
The joint resources of France and Germany lay essentially in their coal 
and steel, distributed unevenly but in complementary fashion over a 
triangular area artificially divided by historical frontiers. With the 
industrial revolution, which had coincided with the rise of doctrinal 
nationalism, these frontiers had become barriers to trade and then lines of 
confrontation. Neither country now felt secure unless it commanded all the 
resources—i.e., all the area. Their rival claims were decided by war, which 
solved the problem only for a time—the time to prepare for revenge. Coal 
and steel were at once the key to economic power and the raw materials for 
forging weapons of war. This double role gave them immense symbolic 
significance, now largely forgotten, but comparable at the time to that of 
nuclear energy today. To pool them across frontiers would reduce their 
malign prestige and turn them instead into a guarantee of peace. (Monnet, 
1976: 293) 
This passage vividly illustrates Monnet’s clear understanding of the 
patterns in which industrial and energy policy had traditionally been 
conceived. The relationship between industrial development and 
international conflict, the importance of control of energy resources (at that 
time coal) as a key to national economic and military power, and the 
emergence of nuclear power in the same role, clearly constitute the reasons 
for Monnet's choice of coal and steel, and later of nuclear power as the 
functional regimes for European integration. His belief was that the 
transformation of these regimes from national into supranational would 
diminish the symbolic importance attached to them and convert them from 
areas of international conflict into forces for cooperation. 
The proposal went through several drafts (nine exist in the archives) 
before Monnet presented it to Schuman on April 28, 1950. Whereas the 
earliest draft proposed the creation of a Federal District (along the lines of 
the District of Columbia in the U.S.) in the French and German steel and 
coal producing regions, the final version contained only a proposal for a 
supranational institutional structure. Monnet’s proposal, thus, was that the 
French and German (as well as any nation’s wishing to join) coal and steel 
industries be placed under the control of a supranational Common High 
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Authority which would have broad powers to create a free market for these 
commodities and integrate national industries to a common international 
regime (Fransen, 2001: 94-98). Monnet’s idea for the structure of the High 
Authority was of a small technocratic institution, similar to the CGP, which 
would be independent from the governments in ways similar to the 
independence of the CGP from the French ministries (Monnet always 
acknowledged his intent to replicate the CGP model—for example the day 
after the Schuman declaration he told a British diplomat that what he had 
in mind was “a European CGP”). (Duchêne, 1994: 210) 
After securing the support for the idea of the German Chancellor 
Conrad Adenauer, Schuman obtained the approval of the French Cabinet 
on May 9 and made what has become known as “The Schuman Plan” 
public at a press conference on the afternoon of that day. In the 
negotiations for the establishment of the European Coal and Steel 
Community that followed, Monnet played a crucial role. He was, in effect, 
the French delegation, as he was the only government appointee on the 
delegation. The rest of the members were his aides whom he had been 
given the authority to select himself. In addition, after meeting with 
Adenauer for the first time, Monnet was asked by the Chancellor to vet the 
prospective head of the German delegation. Monnet, in fact, turned down 
one candidate, the AEG director Hans C. Boden, before endorsing Walter 
Hallstein, a legal expert and rector of Frankfurt University (Duchêne, 1994: 
207-209). 
The negotiations between the six interested nations (France, Germany, 
Italy, Belgium, The Netherlands, and Luxembourg) began in Paris on June 
20, 1950, on the basis of a draft treaty document presented by the French 
delegation. This document envisaged a Community based on a single 
market in coal and steel in which customs duties, national subsidies, and 
discriminatory and restrictive trade practices would be abolished. The 
single market would be established and supervised by a High Authority 
which would have powers to plan supply, handle shortages of supply or 
demand, and prepare production forecasts as guidelines for investment. 
The High Authority would consult with, but be independent from national 
governments. Its independence would be guaranteed by its power to raise 
its own revenue through taxes on the commodities under its authority: coal 
and steel. The High Authority would operate through regional consultative 
associations (similar in many ways to the Modernization Commissions of 
the CGP) that would be organized along natural lines, such as coal basins, 
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regardless of national frontiers. The one significant difference between the 
plan Monnet had presented to Schuman and the draft treaty was the 
inclusion of a Common Assembly, with representatives drawn from the 
national parliaments. The Assembly was included at the suggestion of 
Andre Philip (Christian Socialist politician, former Finance Minister of 
France, and active in the European Federalist movement) in order to 
balance the strictly functionalist technocratic institution of the High 
Authority with a federalist structure. Nevertheless, the Common Assembly 
was to have very limited powers: to review the High Authority’s annual 
report and to censure the Authority by dismissing it en bloc. There was no 
provision for a court, as disputes were to be resolved through ad hoc 
arbitration tribunals, similar to the one Monnet had utilized in 1921, during 
his tenure at the League of Nations, to resolve the conflict between 
Germany and Poland over Upper Silesia (Duchêne, 1994: 210). 
The intense negotiations that lasted for ten months produced a treaty 
(the Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, 
commonly known as the Treaty of Paris—from here on referred to as the 
Treaty) which, while maintaining the core of the draft treaty relatively 
intact, included some important additions. Despite strong efforts by the 
Dutch and Belgian delegations to dilute the supranational powers of the 
High Authority, Monnet, supported by Hallstein, managed to preserve 
them mostly intact. The only concession to intergovernmentalism was the 
inclusion of a Special Council of (national) ministers which would have the 
authority to adopt policies when effects on the economies of the member 
states extended beyond the creation of the common market for coal and 
steel. Thus, the primary purpose of the Council was “harmonizing the 
action of the High Authority and that of the Governments which are 
responsible for the general economic policy of their countries.” (ECSC, 
1951: Article 26) Since it was not meant to be an important policy initiator, 
the treaty, in almost all cases, required Council unanimity, unless proposals 
for Council action emanated from the High Authority. In those cases, 
where the Council could act by majority vote, assent to the High 
Authority’s proposals was facilitated by requiring, in cases where a simple 
majority was not attained and if the High Authority persisted with its 
proposal, presenting it for a “second reading,” only a qualified majority 
vote, which was defined as the vote of any two member States each of 
which accounted for at least twenty percent of the coal and steel production 
of the Community. (ECSC, 1951: Article 28) 
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Pressure from the European Federalist movement also led to a 
significant treaty modification: the formalization of the arbitration tribunals 
into the Community’s own Court of Justice. Despite the infusion of federal 
and intergovernmental institutions, however, the ECSC emerged with a 
predominantly functionalist institutional structure. The High Authority 
remained the central institution of the Community, charged by the Treaty 
with sole responsibility “for assuring the achievement of the purposes 
stated in this Treaty within the terms thereof” (ECSC, 1951: Article 9). The 
nine members of the High Authority were not to be political figures but, 
rather, technical experts, “chosen for their general competence” (ECSC, 
1951: Article 9). It was not simply an administrative or executive body but 
was granted significant legislative powers. Article 14 of the treaty 
authorized it to issue orders, which could be directed to both industry and 
the member States’ governments. Orders were binding and could be issued 
by majority vote of the members of the High Authority in specific issue 
areas specified by the treaty (pertaining primarily to establishing the single 
market for coal and steel and assuring that no violations of the Treaty’s 
objectives were permitted). In most cases its decisions did not require 
Council assent. One important element of what subsequently came to be 
called the principle of “subsidiarity” was put in place by the Treaty, as 
Article 14 prescribed that “Decisions shall be binding with respect to the 
objectives which they specify but shall leave to those to whom they are 
directed the choice of appropriate means for attaining these objectives.” 
(ECSC, 1951) 
The organizational structure of the High Authority reflected directly 
Monnet’s experiences of effective operation at both the intra- and 
intergovernmental levels, taken to the next step—that of a supranational 
institution. This is particularly apparent in the guarantees provided by the 
Treaty for the independence from national governments of the members of 
the High Authority and in the establishment of direct linkages (bypassing 
the national governments) with its constituencies—the coal and steel 
industries. Specifically, the Treaty, in Article 10, specified that eight of the 
nine members of the High Authority were to be appointed by the Member 
States’ governments acting in concert, while the ninth was to be selected by 
the eight appointed members. Thus, none of the High Authority members 
were to represent their governments. The Treaty also bound the Member 
States to refrain from any attempt to influence the members of the High 
Authority (ECSC, 1951: Article 9) and directed the members of the High 
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Authority to exercise their functions purely to promote the common 
interest: 
The members of the High Authority shall exercise their functions in 
complete independence, in the general interest of the Community. In the 
fulfillment of their duties, they shall neither solicit nor accept instructions 
from any government or from any organization. They will abstain from all 
conduct incompatible with the supranational character of their functions. 
Furthermore, the Treaty consolidated and formalized the regional 
consultative associations Monnet had envisioned into a single Consultative 
Committee. The Committee was attached to the High Authority, and its 
members, representing producers, workers, consumers and dealers of coal 
and steel, while coming from specific groups and organizations, served in a 
personal capacity and not as representatives of their group or organization. 
 
4. From the ECSC to European Union 
 
The perception of the people and the governments of Western Europe in 
the aftermath of World War II that energy was scarce and expensive was an 
important factor in the success of the Schuman plan and the creation of an 
ECSC that extended beyond France and Germany. The conditions of 
scarcity lasted through 1956 and 1957. The 1956 closure of the Suez Canal, 
through which most of Western Europe's oil supply passed, heightened 
this perception, leading the High Authority to plan further increases in 
coal-mining capacity (Lucas, 1977: 29). These conditions facilitated the 
completion of the single market in coal because they permitted the ECSC to 
pursue goals that were aligned with national interests (Lambert et al., 1969: 
267-268). In other words, the ECSC appeared to be able to promote national 
economic objectives by facilitating the expansion of the coal and steel 
industries (thus promoting security of supplies and employment). 
The momentum created by the establishment of the ECSC and its 
apparent success over the first few years of its existence led to renewed 
efforts to create more extensive supranational structures in Western 
Europe. The impending re-armament of Germany, made necessary by the 
engagement of the U.S. in the Korean War, provided the impetus for the 
establishment of a European Defense Community (EDC) which would 
control a combined European army. The EDC proposal by French Prime 
Minister René Pleven was, again, rejected by the British, but was received 
positively by the other five ECSC member states. The hitherto success of 
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the ECSC institutional arrangements were clearly a factor in the way 
Pleven shaped his proposal. In his announcement of the EDC plan, Pleven 
made repeated reference to the ECSC as a model for cooperation (Patijn, 
1970: 83). However, whether the institutional model of the ECSC could 
have been effective in directing a European army is questionable (Fursdon, 
1980). 
The EDC treaty, signed by the governments of the six on May 27, 1952, 
largely replicated the institutional arrangements of the ECSC (Patijn, 1970). 
The debate over the establishment of the EDC revealed the need for an 
overarching supranational political entity. This led to the proposal by 
Italian Prime Minister Alcide de Gasperi for the creation of a European 
Political Community (EPC). While the de Gasperi proposal did not lead to a 
separate round of negotiations for an EPC, the EDC treaty included, in its 
Article 38, provision for the subsequent establishment of the EPC. In this 
Article, the EDC treaty directed the (temporary) EDC Assembly to work 
towards the creation of a democratically elected Assembly that was to 
become the cornerstone of the EPC. In fact, at the proposal of the Italian 
representative, in its first meeting in September 1952, the ECSC Council 
appointed a special Assembly, consisting of the ECSC Assembly plus nine 
additional members, to take on the task of applying Article 38 of the EDC 
treaty. This Ad Hoc Assembly produced a Draft Treaty Embodying the 
Statute of the European Community, proposing the establishment of an 
indissoluble federation with a bi-cameral legislature, with real legislative 
powers, and an executive council (Griffiths, 2000). When the French 
parliament voted against ratification of the EDC treaty in 1954, the effort to 
create a Political Community also collapsed and the process of European 
integration seemed to have come to a dead end. However, the success of 
the ECSC in its functional objectives, creating a common market for coal 
and steel, facilitating expansion of these industries and lowering and 
stabilizing prices of these commodities, continued to provide hope. 
Monnet, deciding to take personal charge of the effort to push the 
integration effort forward, resigned his position as President of the High 
Authority in 1955 and created the Action Committee for the United States 
of Europe. This was an informal international organization composed of 
representatives of political parties and trade unions, united by their 
support of the ideal of a federal Europe. This group, along with leading 
politicians such as Adenauer, Hallstein, Spaak, de Gasperi and Beyen, 
brought to bear effective pressure on the governments of the six member 
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states of the ECSC to continue the building of supranational functional 
regimes pursuant to political integration. Common economic interests 
were, again, the focal point of the integration process: 
A new demarche had basically to take account of two things. Firstly 
there was no hope of bringing about a supranational federal state in the 
short term. Secondly, it had to be assumed that no West European state 
would be in a position on its own in the long term to solve its political and 
economic problems effectively within the framework of the nation state 
(Küsters, 1989: 80-81). 
The experience of the failure of the EDC and EPC reinforced Monnet’s 
conviction that, at least for the time being, integration would have to 
proceed along narrow functional lines rather than through the pursuit of 
broad federalist objectives. Specifically, it appeared that the success of the 
ECSC invited the creation of further supranational energy regimes. 
Monnet's vision was that the creation of such regimes would form the basis 
for long-term prosperity in the participating nations; realization that unity 
offered considerable benefits would be unavoidable and could only lead to 
the eventual acceptance of political union by the people of Europe. In 1955 
no energy resource appeared to offer a better prospect for a supranational 
regime than atomic power. Not only was nuclear technology expected to 
produce large amounts of energy at very low cost, but the fact that there 
were no national nuclear regimes yet established, combined with 
technology development costs too high for any European nation to easily 
shoulder alone to make this technology an ideal ground for combining 
efforts and, therefore, for the extension of the ECSC regime. Furthermore, 
nuclear technology’s demonstrated immense destructive potential as a 
weapon of war made some form of international control a critical element 
of the maintenance of peace. Monnet believed that, while coal formed 
Europe’s energy base at the present, atomic energy was the continent’s 
energy future. If a supranational structure controlled both, it would control 
the most crucial element of the European economy. Monnet’s vision for the 
direction of further European integration efforts were concisely and 
explicitly stated as the strategy and goal of the Action Committee for the 
United States of Europe: "The United States of Europe, means: a federal 
power linked to the peaceful exploitation of Atomic Energy." (Monnet, 
1955) 
The rallying call for continuing progress after the failure of the EDC 
took place under the label of "Relance Européenne" (European New 
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Beginning). It started with the proposal of Monnet and the Action 
Committee that unification be broadened to the field of atomic energy 
which would also be placed under the ECSC High Authority. This proposal 
was taken up and extended to include the whole economic sphere by the 
governments of the Benelux countries. At the meeting of the ECSC Foreign 
Ministers, assembled at Messina in June 1955 to choose a successor for 
Monnet as president of the High Authority, the representatives of these 
three countries jointly submitted a memorandum that argued that 
European unity could be achieved only through economic integration. 
They proposed both a "horizontal" integration through the formation of a 
common market and "vertical" integration through joint action in the fields 
of conventional energy, nuclear energy, and transport (Lucas, 1977: 12). 
These proposals were accepted in principle by the other countries, and a 
committee was appointed to study the technical issues surrounding the 
economic integration process. Paul-Henri Spaak, Foreign Minister of 
Belgium and a strong supporter of European integration, was appointed to 
lead the committee which contained a number of officials deeply 
committed to the idea of integration. The committee’s report strongly 
endorsed the ideas contained in both the proposals of the Action 
Committee for the United States of Europe and of the Benelux countries: 
No European country is of the economic status to make the immense 
effort in scientific research and basic investment required to set in motion 
the technical revolution promised by the atomic era. Even if production 
were stepped up by exploiting new sources of energy and applying new 
techniques, it would still be hampered by lack of outlets in the narrow 
confines of the separate European markets. The atomic revolution will in a 
few years’ time make our present economic structure an anachronism. It 
was these considerations which led the six Foreign Ministers at Messina to 
attempt European unification first of all in the economic field, placing the 
emphasis on two essential projects: the pooling of atomic resources and the 
establishment of a general common market. (Council of Europe, 1956: 7) 
In order to pursue the objectives of these proposals, the committee laid 
out a plan that proposed the creation of two new communities, the 
European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy 
Community (Euratom) and urged that the six ECSC Member State 
governments begin negotiations as soon as possible. 
The long and complex negotiations were eventually successful and the 
treaties establishing the two new communities, known as the Treaties of 
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Rome, were signed by the six on March 25, 1957 and came into effect on 
January 1, 1958. The Treaties put in place institutional structures which, in 
part, paralleled and, in part, were in common with that of the ECSC. Each 
of the two new Communities would have its own executive body 
(Commission) which would be advised by a special advisory committee 
(Economic and Social Committee for EEC and both Economic and Social 
Committee and Scientific and Technical Committee for Euratom), and its 
own Council of Ministers. All three Communities would share the Court of 
Justice and parliamentary Assembly that were already part of the ECSC 
(and the EEC and Euratom would share the Economic and Social 
Committee). Thus, the institutional structure of the ECSC was transferred 
fairly intact to the two new Communities (Table 1). 
The Rome Treaties also replicated the provisions requiring that 
appointments to the Commissions be based on the technical qualifications 
of perspective Commissioners, guaranteeing the supranationality and 
independence of action of the Commissioners and requiring that the 
members of the Economic and Social, and Scientific and Technical 
Committees serve in a personal capacity and not as representatives of any 
organization. The main difference in the organization of the new 
Communities vis a vis that of the ECSC was the establishment of the 
Council of Ministers as the primary legislative body. Unlike the ECSC High 
Authority, the EEC and Euratom Commissions had limited legislative 
powers. As with the High Authority, however, the Commissions retained 
the (almost exclusive) right to initiate legislation. The Common Assembly 
retained its very limited role, with its functions in the new Communities 
being essentially the same as in the ECSC and did not benefit from this 
“transfer” of legislative authority. 
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Table 1: Institutions of the ECSC, EEC, and Euratom, as provided by the 
original founding treaties. 
 ECSC EEC Euratom 

























Subsequent Treaties modified the institutional and organizational 
structure but did not change significantly the European Communities’ 
policymaking process. The first of these treaties, the Merger Treaty, signed 
on April 8, 1965 and entering into force on July 1, 1967, merged the 
remaining separate institutions of the three Communities: the ECSC High 
Authority and EEC and Euratom Commissions were merged into a single 
Commission, and the three separate Councils into a single Council of 
Ministers. However, the single new Commission retained the legislative 
powers the ECSC Treaty granted the High Authority in the specific areas 
delineated in the ECSC Treaty, i.e., in matters pertaining to the common 
market in coal and steel. Consequently, the overall policymaking apparatus 
of the now renamed European Communities remained unchanged. 
The Single European Act, signed on February 17, 1986 and entering into 
force on July 1, 1987, and The Treaty on European Union (commonly 
known as the Maastricht Treaty), signed on February 7, 1992 and entering 
into force on November 1, 1993, expanded the Communities’ (first re-
named European Community and, finally, European Union) institutional 
structure by formalizing the regular meetings of the Heads of State or 
Government of the Member States into a new institution, the European 
Council, where major political decisions for furthering the process of 
political integration are to be taken, expanding the court system to include 
a Court of First Instance (to hear a variety of cases as a first-tier court) and a 
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Court of Auditors (to hear administrative cases), and establishing a 
Committee of the Regions as an additional advisory body. They also 
introduced the first significant changes to the policymaking process by 
expanding the issue areas in which the Council of Ministers, when acting 
on Commission proposals, can act by qualified majority vote, and by 
expanding the role of the Assembly (now named European Parliament). 
The Maastricht Treaty in particular gave the European Parliament (whose 
members are now directly elected every five years) a policy-making role. 
While still not able to initiate legislation, or even to take the initiative in 
enacting the Commission’s legislative proposals, it can amend or veto 
legislation in many policy areas. In certain other policy areas, it only has 
the right of consulting with the Commission and Council. Nevertheless, the 
enhancement of the Parliament’s role constitutes the first significant 
departure from the policymaking process put in place by the European 
Union’s founding treaties, the Treaties of Paris and Rome—a departure in 




The policymaking process of the European Union embodies a 
combination of the three fundamental ideologies of international 
organization. The central role of the Commission as policy initiator reflects 
the functionalist ideal of a competent and benevolent technocratic body 
operating outside the constraints of traditional partisan and nationalistic 
politics. This ideal, which originated with Saint-Simon and was at the core 
of French proposals for European integration in the inter-war years (1918-
1939), was finally realized in the ECSC High Authority. Monnet, who was 
anything but a political theorist, conceived the High Authority on the basis 
of his own experiences as to how effective a cohesive, agile, technical body 
could be at resolving problems that appeared to be intractable in both the 
national and international political context. 
The Court and Parliament embody the federalist ideal of supranational 
organization—an ideal that has its roots in the seventeenth century and the 
writings of Crucé and Penn. They were, in fact, included in the institutional 
structure of the ECSC at the urging of federalists such as Andre Philip. 
These institutions, especially the Parliament, however, represented the 
traditional political processes, taken to the international level. For this 
reason, the ECSC Assembly was vested with very little power, and its 
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direct descendent, the European Parliament, enhanced its role in the EU’s 
policymaking process very slowly and, primarily, as a response to the 
“democratic deficit” that has prevailed in the EU from its inception as the 
ECSC until today (Fischer, 2000). 
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